The Interplay Between Corporate Law and Competition Sanctions or Remedies
In: Forthcoming in Florence Thépot and Anna Tzanaki (eds), Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law (Edward Elgar) Forthcoming
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In: Forthcoming in Florence Thépot and Anna Tzanaki (eds), Research Handbook on Competition and Corporate Law (Edward Elgar) Forthcoming
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In: Journal of European Competition Law and Practice (JECLAP), Special Issue on 'The Second Modernisation of EU Competition Law'
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In: European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2017 (EYIEL 2017), Forthcoming
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In: Common Market Law Review, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 270-273
ISSN: 0165-0750
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Working paper
In: Johannes Paha (ed), Competition Law Compliance Programs - An Interdisciplinary Approach, Springer (Forthcoming)
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In: Bulletin e-Competitions De minimis, Art. N° 72780, Forthcoming
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In: Journal of Comparative Law (Forthcoming)
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In: Nicolas Charbit & Elisa Ramundo (eds.), William E. Kovacic: An Antitrust Tribute - Liber Amicorum, Volume II (Institute of Competition Law, 2014) 23-91
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In: Common Market Law Review, Band 49, Heft 5, S. 1811-1814
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 929-970
ISSN: 0165-0750
In the Alrosa case, the ECJ adjudicated on the degree of protection to be afforded to undertakings against disproportionate commitments in the procedure under Article 9 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003. The General Court required a substantially full proportionality review, because commitments are made binding on the undertakings by a unilateral Commission decision. In contrast, the ECJ largely dispensed with the review for proportionality, because commitments are voluntarily offered by the undertakings. The article discusses the hybrid character of commitment decisions between a purely unilateral command and a freely negotiated contract. It argues that the ECJ's Alrosa decision has removed practically all constraints on the Commission in the commitment procedure. This lack of constraints may result in a vicious circle, leading to ever more commitment decisions and ever fewer infringement decisions. Undertakings start to extrapolate their obligations from commitment decisions and guidelines that do not authoritatively state the law. This reliance on "quasi case law" increases the Commission's discretion in future negotiations. The incentives for the Commission to resort to the commitment procedure are especially strong in cases involving novel legal issues, in which the benefit of legal certainty provided by an infringement decision would be particularly large. There is a danger that the struggle for law is abandoned in favour of discretionary case-to-case negotiations. In order to avoid this development, one could either subject the commitment procedure to more demanding constraints or one could make infringement decisions relatively more attractive by allowing the Commission increased discretion in devising proactive remedies.
In: Common Market Law Review, Band 49, Heft 3
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In: published sub nom. What If All Bid Riggers Went to Prison And Nobody Noticed? - Criminal Antitrust Law Enforcement in Germany, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY REGULATORY MOVEMENT, C. Beaton-Wells, A. Ezrachi, eds., Hart Publishing, 2011, 157-182
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In: Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik Band 191